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Effective Tax Rates as a Determinant of F oreign Direct Investment 
in Central and East European Countries: A Panel A nalysisi 
 
by Christian Bellak and Markus Leibrecht 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Central- and East European Countries have lowered their corporate tax rates 
substantially in order to induce shifts of production capacity to their countries. This 
paper analyses empirically how inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows 
channeled to these countries reacts to these tax policies. We estimate a panel of 35 
bilateral country-relationships over a period of 1995-2002. Results suggest a semi-
elasticity of -2.93 which is in line with results derived in studies mainly on OECD 
countries. This indicates that from an individual country perspective, tax-lowering 
strategies have been successful in the past, yet they may not be a successful policy 
option for the future when privatization-related FDI will decrease. 
 
Keywords: Taxation; Foreign Direct Investment; Multinational Enterprises; 
Transformation Economies; 
 
JEL classification: F21, H25 
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1 Introduction 
Governments in Central and East European Countries (CEEC-5; see Table 1) 
intervene to influence the location choice of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) by 
various measures. They provide incentive packages, fiscal and non-fiscal, and they 
try to shape various location factors in order to lower production costs for foreign 
firms. One location factor that figures prominently in actual policy making as well as 
in the public debate is the corporate income tax rate. What is at issue therefore is, 
whether tax-rate cuts are an appropriate policy tool for attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) i i and whether FDI responds significantly to changes of the corporate 
income tax burden in the CEEC-5.  
 
A first look at the data reveals that a close relationship between FDI and corporate 
income taxation is indeed plausible. First, the data show a remarkable surge of 
European and US direct investment into the CEEC-5 during the last years. A 
considerable variation over time and between host and home countries in the 
distribution of FDI is given (see tables 1 and 2).  
 
Table 1  Aggregate FDI flow into the CEEC-5 (USD mn) 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
YEAR (CZ) (HU) (PL) (SK) (Sl) 
1990 72 311 89 93 4 
1991 523 1462 291 81 65 
1992 1003 1479 678 100 111 
1993 654 2350 1715 179 113 
1994 878 1144 1875 273 116 
1995 2568 5103 3659 258 152 
1996 1435 3300 4498 370 174 
1997 1286 4167 4908 231 332 
1998 3700 3828 6365 707 218 
1999 6310 3312 7270 428 106 
2000 4984 2764 9341 1925 137 
 4 
2001 5639 3936 5713 1584 369 
2002 8483 2845 4131 4123 1606 
2003 2583 2470 4225 571 181 
average 1990-1994 626 1349 930 145 82 
average 1995-2003 4110 3525 5568 1133 364 
Source: UNCTAD database. 
 
As expected, larger countries receive the highest FDI inflows. Yet Poland, the 
country with the largest population, performs only slightly better than the Czech 
Republic. This manifests itself in a relatively low FDI stock per capita in Poland (not 
reported). Furthermore Table 1 reveals that there is a surge in FDI inflows to all of 
the CEEC-5 since 1995. 
 
Table 2 Origin of FDI in the CEEC-5 (bilateral stock in per cent of total 
stock) 
Main Home Countries iii 
Country (Year) AUT GER FR IT NL UK US Total 
CZ (2001) 9.99 24.16 6.6 0.61 29.21 6.14 6.40 83.11 
HU (2000) 12. 21 25.81 6.52 2.73 22.52 1.06 8.21 79.06 
PL (2001) 3.33 18.83 15.39 4.15 24.25 3.12 9.54 78.60 
SK (2001) 18.45 22.35 2.65 9.18 15.83 6.83 6.20 81.49 
Sl (2001) 44.5 12.0 10.3 6.2 3.1 4.0 3.8 83.4 
Source: OECD 2004, Bank of Slovenia 2004. 
 
Table 2 shows the origin of FDI stock. The three most important home countries are 
Germany, The Netherlands and Austria. The large share of Austria in Slovenia as 
well as the large shares of Germany and the Netherlands in all countries but Slovenia 
are striking. The data also reveal that most of the FDI stock is owned by European 
Investors. 
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The observed surge in FDI inflow to the CEEC-5 was accompanied by a more or less 
pronounced drop in the overall statutory corporate income tax ratesiv in most of the 
CEEC-5.  
 
Table 3  Overall Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 1996 – 2004 (in per cent) 
Year CZ HU PL SK Sl AUT FR GERv NL UK US IT 
1996 39.00 19.00 40.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 36.70 57.40 35.00 33.00 40.00 52.20 
1997 35.00 19.00 36.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 36.70 57.40 35.00 31.00 40.00 53.20 
1998 35.00 19.14 36.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 41.70 56.70 35.00 31.00 40.00 41.30 
1999 35.00 19.40 34.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 40.00 52.30 35.00 31.00 40.00 41.30 
2000 31.00 19.64 30.00 29.00 25.00 34.00 36.60 51.85 35.00 31.00 40.00 41.25 
2001 31.00 19.64 28.00 29.00 25.00 34.00 35.30 38.67 35.00 30.00 40.00 40.25 
2002 31.00 19.64 28.00 25.00 25.00 34.00 34.30 38.67 34.50 30.00 40.00 40.25 
2003 31.00 19.64 27.00 25.00 25.00 34.00 34.30 39.58 34.50 30.00 40.00 38.25 
2004 28.00 17.66 19.00 19.00 25.00 34.00 34.30 38.67 34.50 30.00 40.00 37.25 
Source: Bellak et al. (2004) 
 
Table 3 shows that all CEEC-5 but Slovenia reduced their rates, notably Slovakia 
and Poland. The average decrease of the rates is 10.9 percentage points. Note, that 
Slovakia started to reduce its rate in 2000 whereas Poland experienced a more 
gradual fall. The slight increase in Hungary between 1998 and 2000 is due to an 
increase in the local business tax. In comparison, the drop in the rates in the seven 
main home countries was modest. The largest reductions occurred in Germany and 
Italy, the countries with the highest rates in 1996. The average fall is about 5.9 
percentage points.  
The three tables presented above therefore suggest the possibility of competition for 
FDI inter alia via tax-rate cuts. But is this relationship statistically and economically 
meaningful? The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate if there is indeed a 
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significant causal relationship between the effective corporate tax burden and FDI-
flows to the CEEC-5. This is done by estimating tax rate elasticities from panel data. 
We thereby focus upon FDI from the main home countries (i.e., Austria, Germany, 
France, Italy, The Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States of America) to 
the CEEC-5 (i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia), 
because the latter are in the center of the ongoing public debate within the EU about 
an increase of (harmful) tax competition. The time span considered here ranges from 
1996 to 2002.vi 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 16.2 gives some brief 
insights to the causes of FDI from a conceptual point of view. Section 16.3 includes a 
short review of existing empirical literature on corporate income taxes as a loc ation 
factor as well as the conceptual background. Section 16.4 discusses the variables 
and the methodology used in the estimation. In section 16.5 the estimation results 
are presented and discussed, section 16.6 summarizes.  
 
2 Theoretical background 
The causes of FDI into a particular country have been studied extensively in the 
literature. It is useful to separate these causes into two distinct questions (Frenkel et 
al. 2004). First, why does FDI emerge at all? Second, why does a particular country 
succeed in the competition for FDI?  
Turning to the first question, broadly speaking two distinct motives why firms want to 
undertake FDI are given (Navaretti and Venables 2004). The first motive is to supply 
a market directly through a subsidiary. This is termed horizontal or market-oriented 
FDI (HFDI). The second motive is to find low production cost locations. This type of 
FDI is termed vertical or efficiency-oriented FDI (VFDI) and is primarily motivated by 
factor-cost differentials. Moreover new FDI (NFDI) and expansion of existing FDI 
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(EFDI) should be distinguished, since both decisions may depend on different 
determinants. The latter distinction is particularly relevant for taxation issues 
discussed below. 
Despite this clear conceptual separation between HFDI and VFDI, it is difficult to 
separate FDI empirically. For example, a particular location may be chosen not only 
due to its low production costs but also for its proximity to large neighboring markets. 
This introduces a horizontal motive to the - at first sight - purely vertical one 
(Navaretti and Venables 2004; Caves 1996). Furthermore affiliates in the CEECs are 
often supplied with headquarter services from abroad (like controlling, R&D, 
advertising) and yet still are horizontal FDI. 
Discussion of these motives for FDI per se does not give a satisfying answer to the 
first question raised above. An answer is provided by the OLI-paradigm (Dunning 
1988; Markusen 1995). Based upon various theories (e.g. Trade Theory and Theory 
of Industrial Organization) it proposes that FDI emerges if a firm has an Ownership 
(O) advantage (e.g. a patent) combined with a Location (L) advantage (e.g. low 
production costs; large market size) and an Internalization (I) advantage (e.g. 
economies of interdependent activities). If only an O advantage is given, licensing 
results. If an O- and an I-advantage are given exports instead of FDI are used for 
servicing the foreign market. The predictions of the OLI-paradigm about the choice of 
the route of foreign market servicing are lis ted in Table 4. 
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Table 4  The choice for Foreign Direct Investment 
Ownership - 
advantages  
Internalization-
advantages  
Location-
advantages 
Lead to the 
following type of 
foreign market 
servicing… 
… resulting in 
the following 
location choice 
of production 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Abroad 
Yes Yes No 
 
Exports 
 
Domestic 
Yes No No 
Contractual 
resource 
transfers 
Domestic 
Why? How? Where?    
Source: based on Dunning (1988). 
 
The second question, why a particular country succeeds in the competition for FDI, is 
answered by identifying the most important host country determinants or L-factors 
which attract FDI, conditional upon a firm’s decision to undertake FDI. Yet the OLI-
paradigm provides examples of potential determinants only. In particular, it does not 
suggest how to operationalize the L-advantages. The OLI paradigm neither does 
attribute weights to single location factors like taxation, nor does it assess their 
relative weights (e.g. taxes vs. relative unit labor costs). 
The selection of relevant L-advantages for an empirical analysis therefore remains a 
difficult issue, which can only be tackled by looking at the empirical evidence given 
so far. 
 
3 The impact of taxation on FDI 
It is difficult to come up with strong predictions about the consequences of tax-rate 
cuts on FDI inflows in CEEC-5. This is due to a conceptual and an empirical 
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argument. This subsection therefore takes a brief look at earlier evidence and 
discusses a number of conceptual points in the remainder.  
There exist only a few empirical studies, which suggest a mixed picture. These 
studies suggest that taxes have only a relatively low impact on FDI to CEEC-5. In 
Bellak et al. (2004) we survey six papers which include taxes as a determinant of FDI 
and find a median tax rate elasticity of -0.22. This implies that a 1 percentage point 
change in the tax rate will reduce FDI by 0.22 percent. This value is well below the 
value of -3.3 found by DeMooij and Ederveen (2003 and 2001) for FDI to mainly 
developed countries and also well below the value of -0.6 which Desai et al. (2004) 
suggest as a rule of thumb. 
The low semi-elasticity of -0.22 may be explained by the following facts, which are 
partly transition-specific: 
· Tax-cutting strategies of governments may have little impact on FDI, since FDI 
may reflect strategic decisions by the management and are thus only partly 
cost-driven in the short run (compared to portfolio investment which reacts 
more directly to changes in profitability). 
· As far as FDI-flows contribute to expansionary investment, it may react less 
than in the case of new investment, Greenfield investment in particular. 
· Given the large number of location factors stated to be relevant for location 
decisions by firms themselves, taxes may well have a lower relative weight 
than other location factors. 
· Also, the possibility for transfer pricing may turn the tax burden for MNEs 
ceteris paribus in a non-issue. 
· But the validity of this relatively low value is also questionable from a 
conceptual point of view as most of the papers surveyed use the statutory  
corporate income tax rates as measure of tax burden in the host countries 
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instead of the for FDI better suited (forward looking) bilateral effective average 
tax rates. Using the statutory tax rate of the host country may therefore result 
in a sort of measurement error bias in the estimated tax rate elasticities as the 
BEATRs differ in level and variability from the statutory corporate income tax 
rates (see Bellak et al. (2004) for details).  
 
It therefore remains mainly an empirical question to determine the role of the tax 
burden for FDI for particular countries and particular time periods and thus raises 
interesting methodological issues. This study adds to the literature by considering the 
tax burden as a determinant of FDI in general, and more importantly by using 
BEATRs instead of the statutory corporate income tax rates as measure of tax 
burden. 
 
4 Variables, Data and Methodology 
 
Dependent Variable  
Net-bilateral-FDI-outflow-to-GDP-ratio from home country (i) to host country (j) fo r the 
years 1996 to 2002 (t) is used as the dependent variable. FDI data are taken mainly 
from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1991–2002.vii 
Due to various problems related to the measurement of FDI (e.g. valuation problems, 
negative FDI-flow values; cf. e.g. Falzoni 2000) we do not use a logarithmic 
specification, but we normalize bilateral FDI flows by the host country GDP in order 
to reduce existing heterogeneity between country-pairs in FDI flows. 
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Independent Variables  
As we are entirely concerned with the second question raised above (where to 
locate?) our independent variables have to be valid proxies for host country-related L 
advantages. We base our choice of independent variables upon the findings of some 
recent and/or widely cited studies.viii Specifically, we use as right-hand-side variables 
proxies for the L-factor taxation, which is our variable of main interest and we control 
for other important location factors.  
 
(a) Taxation (eatr) 
In Bellak et al. (2004) we argue that from a conceptual and empirical point of view 
forward looking effective tax rates should be used for assessing the role of corporate 
income taxation on FDI. More precisely, we argue that for location decision of MNEs 
forward-looking, cross border (bilateral) effective average tax rates (BEATR) should 
be used. Table 5 summarizes this view. It shows the relation between FDI and 
taxation concerning the problem of location choice. From the OLI paradigm we 
conclude that the L-advantages determine the location choice (where?) in the case of 
FDI. Combining this FDI-related argument with the argument of the taxation 
literature, which states that for discrete choices the average tax rate is relevant, 
reveals that bilateral effective average tax rate are the relevant L-factor to reflect the 
tax component of the location decision of MNEs. Hence, we use the BEATRs as a 
measure of the tax burden. The rates are calculated using the methodology 
developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999). For further details concerning 
assumptions and the calculation, see the appendix and Bellak et al. 2004. We expect 
a negative sign of the estimated coefficient. 
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Table 5 Parent Company’s Location Decision: OLI and taxation 
MNC decision 
Determinants 
according to the 
OLI paradigm 
Result 
Relevant 
Effective rax 
rate 
1. Why and 
how? O, I FDI 
 
-- 
 
2. Domestic 
or Abroad: 
Where? 
L 
(e.g. tax burden) 
Choice of 
particular 
country / 
location 
Average  
3. How much? -- 
Scale of 
investment 
abroad 
Marginal 
Source: Based on Devereux and Griffith (2002) 
 
(b) Market size (popmio) 
In theory host-country market size increases FDI since a larger host market 
increases the likelihood that MNEs will be able to recoup the costs of their foreign 
investment (Navaretti and Venables 2004). We therefore expect a positive sign of the 
estimated coefficient. Market size is proxied by the population (in mn) of the host 
country. 
 
(c) Privatization (share) 
The share of the private sector in the host country’s GDP as published annually by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is intended to 
capture the privatization process in the CEEC-5 (EBRD various years; Holland and 
Pain 1998). An increasing private market share implies privatization of former state-
owned property and hence the possibility for foreign firms to engage in FDI. 
Moreover, privatization may act as a signal of commitment to private ownership 
(Holland and Pain 1998) and a larger private sector market share per se implies 
more possibilities to engage in FDI. We therefore expect a positive sign of the 
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estimated coefficient. Figure 1 depicts the close interrelationship between FDI and 
privatization revenues on a descriptive basis. 
 
Figure 1 Privatization revenues and FDI 
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1995 1998 2001 1995 1998 2001 1995 1998 2001 1995 1998 2001 1995 1998 2001
mn USD
Privatisation Revenue
FDI
CZE HU PL SK SI
 Source:  EBRD Transition Reports, WIIW Database. 
 
(d) Distance (dist) 
Distance is an important determinant of FDI (Brainard 1997). It is especially relevant 
for production FDI where economies of scale on the plant level at the affiliate have to 
be weighed against the costs of exporting. This measure has been frequently used in 
gravity-type models as well as in specifications in empirical studies explaining FDI. 
The expected sign of the estimated coefficient is ambiguous a priori. While large 
distance may encourage FDI due to an I-advantage it also may discourage it due to 
the lack of market know-how, higher communication and information costs and 
differences in culture and institutions (Buch et al. 2004 and 2005; Buch and Lipponer 
2004). 
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(e) Home –country population (pophmio) 
In order to account for size differences of the home countries, we include population 
of the home (in mn) countries as a control variable. Since the outward investment 
potential of larger countries is higher than that of smaller countries, home-country 
size is expected to be positively related to inward FDI in the host country.ix  
 
(f) Tariffs (tar) 
Tariff is the ratio of tariffs on imports over imports of goods and services. From a 
theoretical point of view the sign of the coefficient of this variable is a priori 
ambiguous depending upon the underlying motive for FDI. If the observed FDI is 
mainly HFDI then the market imperfection theory of FDI suggests a positive sign. 
High trade costs may encourage HFDI because servicing more distant markets via 
exports is more expensive, not least due to transport cos ts. In this case HFDI is 
observed due to an internalization advantage (tariff-jumping FDI). On the other hand 
if FDI is mainly VFDI then theory suggests a negative sign (Frenkel et al. 2004; 
Navaretti and Venables 2004). In the case of VFDI high trade costs can be seen as a 
location-disadvantage, which deters FDI. For the CEECs we emphasize the tariff-
jumping hypothesis, which refers to final-goods production to supply the host-country 
market. Yet, this reasoning suggests a positive relationship between trade costs and 
FDI is not relevant here, since trade costs have been lowered substantially in 
absolute terms during the last years, especially vis-à-vis the EU. Rather, we expect a 
negative relationship between trade costs and FDI flows, i.e. the lower the tariffs on 
imports, the higher the incentive to undertake FDI with a high input share supplied 
mostly by the parent company from abroad.  
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(g) Risk (risk) 
In countries in transition, where not only economic, but also political turmoil may 
arise, political risk may play a role as a determinant of FDI, too. We expect a 
negative relationship (a positive coefficient) between risk and FDI.  
 
(h) Inflation (infl) 
The sign of the coefficient of this variable is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand it 
may have a negative impact upon FDI due to the macroeconomic instabilities high 
inflation rates imply (Buch and Lipponer 2004). On the other hand it may have 
positive effects for example via  exchange rate changes: An appreciation of the home 
country’s currency alters the price for acquiring assets in the host country and it may 
lead to a substitution of exports for foreign production. For our sample it is important 
to note that inflation has been brought down substantially compared to the early 
transition period. Hence it may no longer impact (negatively) upon FDI. 
 
Methodology  
Our data set constitutes a panel of seven home countries (i), five host countries (j) 
and seven years (t). The estimated model is generally specified as follows: 
 
ijtjititjtijtijt eBZBWBXGDPFDI ++++++= bag3
'
2
'
1
')/(      (1) 
 
(FDI/GDP)ij t is the FDI to GDP ratio and Xi j t, Wj t and Zi t are (1 x kl, l = 1,2,3) vectors of 
right-hand side variables described above. All of the right hand side variables except 
eatr, dist, popmio  and pophmio are measured in levels. The eatr is used in log-form 
to allow for possible non-linearities. More specifically, the log -form implies that the 
higher the eatr-level, the higher the absolute change in eatr for a given change in the 
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dependent variable needs to be. Popmio, pophmio and dist are used in log-form as 
this reduces the range of values of the variables and makes estimation procedures 
more robust. Due to the inclusion of relatively large countries like Poland (among the 
host countries) and the US (among the home countries), respectively, or relatively 
distant home countries (US) a log-transformation is needed. 
tg , ia , and jb  are fixed time, host and home country effects. Hence this specification 
follows the gravity-model literature (e.g. Mátyás 1997; Frenkel et al. 2004). ei j t is the 
remainder error term.  
The model is estimated by pooled OLS. In a first round of specification search severe 
outliers are detected by using common descriptive statistics (studentized residuals, 
Cook’s Distance) and added variable plots. Ten data points are detected as severe 
outliers (GER-SK (2002), GER-SK (2000), GER-HU (1998), GER-CZ (2002), US-SK 
(2001), US-HU (2000), UK-HU (1999), FR-SK (2002), FR-PL (2000), AUT-SK 
(2001)). These data points make up about four percent of our sample and are 
dropped from the analysis. 
In a second round we estimate various models starting from one which includes all of 
the variables described above. Since tests (Breusch-Pagan-test for 
heteroskedasticity and Arellano-Bond-test for serial correlation; see table 6) show the 
presence of non-spherical residuals, we use Newey-West robust covariance 
estimates (lag of 2) throughout the analysis. We first test the fixed effects for 
significance via robust Wald -Tests. This shows that time as well host-country fixed 
effects can be removed from the specification. Home-country fixed effects are jointly 
highly significant. Next we analyze sign and significance of our substantive variables 
in ,'ijtX
'
jtW  and 
'
itZ . Insignificant variables are dropped stepwise. As insignificance 
may be due to multicollinearity we check for its presence via (robust) Wald-tests, 
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cross-correlations, variance inflation factors and condition numbers. High 
multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem (see table 6 below). Four variables 
(lnpophmio, risk, tar and infl) are dropped one by one, with little impact upon sign and 
magnitude of the remaining coefficients. We include time and host country fixed 
effects again after dropping lnpophmio, risk, tar and infl in our specification, but they 
remain insignificant. 
 
 
Table 6         Correlation Matrix 
 lneatr lnpopmio lnpophmio lndist share infl tar risk 
         
lneatr 1.00         
lnpopmio 0.39 1.00        
lnpophmio 0.21 -0.00 1.00       
lndist 0.11 0.09 0.76 1.00      
share 0.24 0.26 -0.01 -0.05 1.00    
infl -0.18 0.13 -0.00 0.05 -0.30 1.00    
tar 0.47 0.61 0.00 0.06 -0.28 0.30 1.00   
risk -0.51 -0.20 0.00 0.02 -0.24 0.16 -0.24 1.00 
 
 
 
Table 7         Summary Statistics – Dependent Variable 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
fdigdp 235 overall 0.356 0.460 -0.689 2.486 
(in %)  between  0.344 0.004 1.332 
  within  0.318 -0.787 2.044 
fdigdp       
per host  CZ 0.450    
(in %)  PL 0.353    
  HU 0.519    
  Sl 0.180    
  SK 0.293    
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Table 8         Summary Statistics – Independent Variables 
Variable Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
lneatr 235 overall 3.421 0.262 2.936 3.839 
  between  0.250 2.938 3.728 
  within  0.085 3.164 3.623 
share 235 overall 72 7.612 55 80 
(in %)  between  6.599 61.428 77.857 
  within  3.807 64.142 79.5 
lndist 235 overall 6.899 1.024 4.036 8.900 
  between  1.054 4.036 8.900 
  within  0 6.899 6.899 
lnpopmio 235 overall 2.135 0.981 0.684 3.654 
  between  0.980 0.687 3.651 
  within  0.0038 2.127 2.143 
lnpophmio 235 overall 3.844 1.064 2.074 5.663 
  between  1.076 2.079 5.616 
  within  0.0127 3.809 3.897 
tar  overall 5.663 8.992 0 46.230 
(in %)  between  6.779 0.005 19.360 
  within  5.944 -6.440 33.864 
Infl  overall 8.240 4.614 1.290 21.200 
(in %)  between  2.629 5.386 13.273 
  within  3.835 0.238 17.913 
Risk  overall 62.945 8.554 39.000 75.420 
(0 – 100 points)  between  6.248 51.126 70.204 
  within  6.034 48.10099 73.449 
Eatr  overall 31.650 7.866 18.850 46.520 
(in %)  between  7.389 18.887 41.931 
  within  2.943 22.235 38.021 
gdp  (host)  overall 63010.500 55858.890 15882.100 207128.200 
(EUR mn)  between  53988.700 19463.520 164549.100 
  within  15471.670 19556.150 108264.900 
 
 
5 Results 
 
Our final specification includes lneatr, share, lnpopmio, lndist and a full set of home 
country dummies as regressors.  
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Table 9         Estimation Results  
Dep. Var.: (FDI/GDP)-ratio 
Pooled OLS with Newey-West robust 
standard errors (lag 2) 
 lneatr  -0.330** 
 (-2 .99) 
 share  0.0082** 
 (2.38) 
 lndist  -0 .281*** 
 (-3.55) 
 lnpopmio  0.117*** 
 (3.88) 
 constant  3.004*** 
 (3.30 ) 
 Number of Obser vations  235 
 R-squared 38.48 
 F-Test (10; 224) 12.85*** 
 Arellano-Bond-Test AR(1) 2.92*** 
 Arellano-Bond-Test AR(2) 2.02** 
 Arellano-Bond-Test AR(3) 0.87 
 Breusch-Pagan-Test 87.07*** 
 Note: t-values in parenthesis  
*/**/*** denote significance  at the 90/95/99% confidence level 
 Home country fixed effects included and significant. 
 Host country and time fixed effects are not significant. 
 Risk , tar, infl  and lnpophmio  are not significant. 
 
Table 9 shows that controlling for major determinants of FDI flows tax rate reductions 
had a statistically significant impact on the FDI/GDP-ratio in the past. From a more 
substantive point of view the coefficient (REM) on lneatr of -0.330 implies that a one 
percent decrease in the eatr increases the FDI/GDP-ratio by 0.0033 percentage 
points. Evaluated at the overall averaged FDI/GDP ratio (about 0.356%; see table 7) 
and the overall averaged GDP (about EUR 63010.5 mn, see table 8), a one percent 
reduction of the tax rate ceteris paribus  would lead to an increase of FDI inflows of 
about EUR 2.10 mn on average. From the coefficient on lneatr a tax-rate elasticity 
(semi-elasticity) of about -2.93 (evaluated at the overall averaged mean FDI/GDP-
ratio and eatr) is derived. Given the overall averaged mean eatr of about 31.65 
percent (see table 8) the semi-elasticity implies that a decrease of the eatr to 30.65 
percent would increase FDI inflows by EUR 6.7 mn. The semi-elasticity of -2.93 is 
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substantially larger than the median semi-elasticity of -0.22 surveyed by Bellak et al. 
(2004) and it is much more in line with the results derived by DeMooij and Ederveen 
(2003).  
The coefficient of share implies that a one percentage point increase in share  would 
ceteris paribus increase the FDI/GDP-ratio by 0.0081 percentage points. This results 
in a semi-elasticity of +2.27. Hence, a one percentage point increase in the private 
market share results in an increase of FDI flows by 2.27 percent. Given an overall 
mean share of 72% (see table 16.8) an increase of share by 1 percentage point will 
increase FDI flows by EUR 5.10 mn. The semi-elasticities for popmio and dist are 
+1.03 and -2.50, respectively (all semi-elasticites are evaluated at the overall 
averaged mean of FDI/GDP-ratio and eatr).  
Concerning other explanatory variables the insignificance of pophmio may be 
explained with the inclusion of home country fixed effects. The insignificance of tar 
can be explained with the minor importance of tariffs (overall mean of 5.6 percent; 
see table 16.8) almost throughout our sample. Risk may play no role, first, because 
our host countries are not that different in this respect and second, because the host 
country with the lowest risk level (Slovenia) also has the lowest FDI/GDP-ratio (see 
table 16.7). The insignificance of infl is in line with other studies (e.g. Frenkel et al. 
2004). Moreover inflation has been brought down considerably in the host countries 
considered here. Hence the insignificance of inflation seems to be a plausible result. 
Finally, standardized coefficients (not shown) suggest that dist is the most important 
determinant of FDI in our specification. From a policy perspective perhaps more 
interesting is that taxation (eatr: beta = -0.189) exerts a slightly stronger impact upon 
FDI than the privatization process (share: beta = +0.135). 
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6 Summary 
During the past few years lowering the corporate tax rate was seen as a key policy 
instrument to attract FDI of foreign MNEs in CEEC-5. Tax rates are an attractive 
policy tool for policy-makers, because they can easily be changed and are thought to 
affect the behavior of economic agents immediately. This chapter investigates 
whether there is indeed a significant relationship between corporate taxation and FDI 
empirically. Our empirical study, which is based on a panel data set includes the 
bilateral effective tax rates (BEATRs) instead of the statutory tax rate and as controls 
mainly variables which intend to capture the differences in L-advantages of the 
CEEC-5. 
Contrary to earlier evidence which suggests a minor role of taxes for FDI in the 
CEECs, our regression analysis of FDI flows into five East European host countries 
from their seven most important home countries confirms the importance of the tax-
rate as a determinant. The deduced tax-rate elasticity is about -2.93. This result is, 
inter alia a consequence of replacing the statutory tax rate in the estimation by a 
more appropriate measure, namely the BEATR.  
Hence, from an individual country perspective, tax-lowering strategies have been 
successful in attracting FDI in the past. Yet we doubt that the results of our analysis  
provide a good guidance for future policy strategies (i.e. further tax-rate cuts) in the 
CEECs, as created assets  such as high quality public infrastructure  certainly will 
become more decisive location factors, particularly if these countries are to profit 
more from headquarter services, R&D activites etc. of foreign MNEs. 
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8 Databases 
· Austrian Institute of Economic Research database 
· European Commission AMECO database 
· Eurostat New Cronos database 
· European Innovation Scoreboard 2004 Database 
· OECD Foreign Direct Investment Statistics database 
· UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment database 
· Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies database 
· World Development Indicators 
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9 Appendix: Detailed description of data and data sources 
 
· FDI/GDP 
FDI reflects the bilateral net-FDI outflows from the home countries (i) to the host 
countries (j) for the years (t) 1996 to 2002. FDI flow data were first converted into a 
common currency (EUR mn) using the average bilateral exchange rate in t. FDI data 
are taken mainly from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 
1991 – 2002 and the OECD Foreign Direct investment database. Missing values for 
the US are substituted by information provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). For the UK missing values are amended by data provided by Eurostat 
“European Union Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook 2001” vis-à-vis Slovakia and 
the Direct Investment Report of the Bank of Slovenia vis -à-vis Slovenia. GDP data 
come from the New Cronos database. 
 
· eatr 
The average effective tax rate is calculated using the Devereux-Griffiths (1999) 
methodology, based on the following assumptions and parameters: 
§ 3 different assets (machinery, building and inventory in the manufacturing 
sector) 
§ 7 ways of financing a cross border investment of 1 with a pre-tax financial 
return of 20: (i) retained earnings subsidiary; (ii) new equity subsidiary and 
retained earnings parent; (iii) debt subsidiary and retained earnings parent; (iv) 
new equity subsidiary and new equity parent; (v) debt subsidiary and debt 
parent; (vi) new equity subsidiary and debt parent; (vii) debt subsidiary and 
new equity parent. 
 26 
§ economic depreciation rates of the various assets: 3.61% for buildings, 
12.25% for machinery, 0 for inventory 
§ nominal interest rate of 7.625% 
§ common inflation rate of 2.5% 
§ constant nominal exchange rate 
§ a weighted average structure of assets (buildings / machinery / inventory) of 
55 / 35 / 10 
§ a weighted average structure across the various types of financing (retained 
earnings / equity / debt): 55 / 10 / 35 for parent and 1/3 / 1/3 / 1/3 for subsidiary 
 
Our assumptions about the asset structure differ from those of other studies, which 
mainly follow OECD (1991), because data on inventories in the CEE-NMS show that 
they are far less important than they have been within the OECD as reported in 1991. 
Instead we assign a higher weight to investment in buildings. Note also that we do 
not include any tax incentives in our measure since the choice of relevant incentives 
in each home and host country would be arbitrary. eatr is measured in percent. 
 
· share 
This variable is taken from various issues of the Transition Report published by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is measured in percent. 
 
· dist 
Distance is defined as the geographical distance between the capital cities of the 
home and the host country in kilometers. Data are taken from various internet 
sources. 
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· pophmio 
Home–country population is defined as total population (in mn) of the seven home 
countries. Data are taken from the WDI database and from Eurostat. 
 
· popmio 
Host-country population is defined as the total population (in mn) of the five host 
countries. Data are taken from Eurostat. 
 
§ risk 
Risk data come from various issues of “Euromoney”. 100 is the maximum value 
(lowest possible risk level) and zero the minimum value (highest possible risk value). 
To obtain the overall country risk score, Euromoney assigns a weighting to nine 
categories. These are political risk (25% weight), economic performance (25%), debt 
indicators (10%), Debt in default or rescheduled (10%), credit ratings (10%), access 
to bank finance (5%), access to short-term finance (5%), access to capital markets 
(5%), forfaiting (5%). 
 
§ infl 
As a proxy for inflation the GDP-deflator of each host country is used, taken from the 
AMECO database. 
 
§ tar 
tar is defined as the ratio of “tariffs on imports” (from Eurostat, Main National 
Accounts, Position D212: “taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT”, position S13: 
General Government) over “imports of goods and services”, taken from the European 
Commission’s AMECO database. 
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11 Endnotes 
 
                                              
i This study has been prepared under FWF contract Nr. 1008, 
Sonderforschungsbereich “International Tax Coordination”, http://www.sfb-itc.at/  
ii From now on, it is convenient to use the term FDI for the location choice of MNEs, it 
being understood that FDI is an operationalisation for the “activity of MNEs in the 
host country”. 
iii AUT = Austria, GER = Germany, FR = France, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, 
UK = United Kingdom, US = United States. 
iv “Overall” means that local business taxes are included. 
v The overall tax rate for not distributed profits is shown. 
vi The analysis starts with the year 1996 due to the deep recession in the CEEC up to 
1995 and ends with the year 2002 due to restrictions in data availability. 
vii A detailed data description can be found in the Appendix. 
viii In particular we base our choice upon following papers: Navaretti and Venables 
2004, Carstensen and Toubal 2004; Frenkel et al. 2004; Desai et al 2004; Holland 
and Pain 1998. 
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ix In per capita terms, however, small countries typically invest more abroad, e.g. 
Switzerland, Netherlands. 
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